Indictment Structure for Historical Allegations: A Missed Opportunity at the Supreme Court of Canada?

A recent case heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. M.R.H., involved the issue of indictments that spanned multiple alleged historical sexual assault incidents into one individual count. Since the removal of the statute of limitations on sex crimes approximately three decades ago, this has been common practice by police services and Crown prosecutors in the name of "simplification". The insidious practice combines ​

distinctly separate incidents that had allegedly occurred in different places (sometimes even different jurisdictions) and at different unspecified time frames into one count and then multiplying that count into different offence categories related to the same alleged individual incident covered by one uniform span of time. Not only is requiring an accused person to defend themselves against this indictment structure exceedingly unfair, but it can ultimately leave a jury confused as to how to convict or acquit if they believe only some of the prosecution's case.

R. v. M.R.H's original indictment started out like this:

• Count 1 - Touching for a Sexual Purpose at place A  between 2006 and 2011
• Count 2 - Invitation to Sexual Touching at  place A  between 2006 and 2011
• Count 3 - Sexual Assault at place A between 2006 and 2011
• Count 4 - Touching for a Sexual Purpose at place B between 2006 and 2011
• Count 5 - Invitation to Sexual Touching at  place B between 2006 and 2011
• Count 6 - Sexual Assault at place B between 2006 and 2011

And then it evolved to this at trial:

• Count 1 - Touching for a Sexual Purpose at place A and place B  between 2006 and 2011
• Count 2 - Sexual Assault at place A and place B between 2006 and 2011

This confusion was the basis for arguments in R. v. M.R.H. on October 9, 2019. The jury seemed to have trouble understanding if finding guilt on the first count meant they also had to find guilt on the second count. Thus implying, as posited surprisingly by Crown counsel, that due to the indictment structure and potential difficulties of weighing credibility there may be a problem with jury deliberations that would not exist if each alleged distinct incident was separated into its own count.

You can watch or listen to the hearing's webcast by clicking here.

After having listened to the entire hearing myself, I fear that the end result will be M.R.H.'s convictions being restored and that the SCC will have passed on the perfect opportunity to set some ground rules on the practice of combining multiple incidents covered by one time frame into individual counts. I will explain why.

Firstly, the main issue at hand in this case was that the jury was given confusing instruction by the trial judge with regard to understanding the structure of the indictment, and its relationship to conducting a credibility assessment with regards to both counts with the same time frame. At the SCC hearing, Crown counsel -- since they are the appellant seeking to restore conviction they presented first  --  was enticed by one of the SCC judges to go down the road of arguing their stance on whether or not the indictment structure itself is an issue worthy to entertain.  Reluctantly the Crown visited the issue and then came the admission by the judge that it was an issue never before assessed by the Supreme Court of Canada. After hearing this particular exchange I started trembling with hope and anticipation that finally something was going to be done about this horrible practice. Finally, I thought to myself, thousands of innocent men across Canada can have an SCC ruling by which to have their (wrongful) convictions overturned, deemed as unsafe convictions by way of finding it unconstitutional to combine multiple alleged incidents into one count.

I was quite surprised at how candid Crown counsel was in highlighting these issues in their own oral arguments. Alas they were not there to argue that, and eventually steered back to their preferred issue of whether or not the jury could have been confused by the trial judge's instructions. Then defence counsel (not same as trial defence counsel)  stepped up and I eagerly anticipated if he would rejoin the indictment structure issue handily setup by the SCC judge. It didn't take long for my initial excitement to deflate. This counsel had no interest in going there and even told the court he understood those were minor issues that he didn't want to bother them with. Clearly ignorant or oblivious to the fact the court clearly showed interest. He pressed on with jury confusion relevant solely to the judge's instructions in a uninterested, boring, and at times even rude manner likely destroying the opportunity for freedom for his client and for the SCC to potentially provide guidance on the indictment structure issue - the root cause for jury confusion in the first place.

As of October 12th, the decision on this matter has been reserved and I will update this article when it has been released. Until then, I believe this was a missed opportunity, albeit raised by the SCC judge herself, but regretfully not pursued by defence counsel. Generally if an argument raised by anyone at a hearing is not counter-argued  by an opposing party, it will not be considered by the judicial panel.